‘Kosovo’s moves towards Israel are the price of aligning with US policy’ 

Kosovo, a small majority-Muslim country in the Balkans, has signed up to United States President Donald Trump’s controversial Board of Peace and the planned International Stabilization Force for Gaza, after Israel gave its approval.

The proposed force is, in theory, expected to help maintain security, support demilitarisation and train Palestinian police, though its mandate and composition remain unclear.

For Kosovo, the decision has a particular resonance.

Its statehood and security depend on international support and NATO protection, as well as the right of a population under pressure from a stronger neighbour to decide its own future. It is now joining a Gaza framework whose legitimacy is contested by Palestinian actors and legal experts, and in which Israel retains decisive influence.

A debt to repay?

Kosovo was an autonomous province within Serbia in the former Yugoslavia until Slobodan Milosevic stripped it of much of its self-government in 1989. Repression and the political marginalisation of Kosovo Albanians culminated in the 1998-99 war, after the Kosovo Liberation Army launched a rebellion against Serbian and Yugoslav forces.

Serbian and Yugoslav forces responded with killings, expulsions and mass displacement; more than 10,000 Kosovo Albanian civilians were killed. The Hague tribunal later convicted senior Serbian and Yugoslav officials for war crimes and crimes against humanity. After NATO’s 78-day 1999 air campaign, Serbian and Yugoslav forces withdrew.

NATO’s KFOR force, Kosovo’s principal external security guarantor, arrived that June.

Nexhmedin Spahiu, a university professor and political analyst in Pristina, says Kosovo’s approach to Israel reflects a perceived obligation to Washington and, in his view, to the pro-Israel lobby in the US.

NATO and US intervention, Kosovo’s recognition, and the assistance received from the United States are consequences of the lobby’s “influence”, he said. “People in Kosovo feel they have a moral debt … and that is the reason for Kosovo’s approach to Israel.”

For many Kosovo Albanians, the US is associated with the end of repression, the return of refugees and the conditions that made independence possible.

With Serbia still refusing to recognise Kosovo and periodic tensions continuing, US backing and NATO deterrence remain central to Pristina’s security.

“Kosovo’s moves towards Israel are the price of aligning with American policy,” Spahiu said. “It is about repaying old debts.”

From recognition to partnership

Relations with Israel developed within this US-centred logic. Under the Washington agreement of September 2020, Kosovo committed to opening an embassy in Jerusalem. Israel formally recognised Kosovo in February 2021, and Pristina opened its embassy there the following month, becoming the first majority-Muslim country to do so.

Donika Emini, a research fellow at the University of Graz’s Centre for Southeast European Studies, said recognition was “unquestionably a major diplomatic and political achievement” for Kosovo.

Israel’s recognition carried strategic value beyond the bilateral relationship. For Pristina, she added, it helped counter the argument used by states with their own territorial disputes that they could not recognise Kosovo, showing that domestic sovereignty concerns need not prevent such a political decision.

“The relationship has, therefore, been moving beyond recognition towards a broader strategic partnership,” she said, citing Kosovo’s interest in closer security cooperation with Israel.

For Kosovo’s leadership, Israel’s recognition was a concrete victory, while the Jerusalem embassy formed part of a package linked to the first Trump administration. Emini said the calculation was also about strengthening its relationship with Washington.

Artan Muhaxhiri, a Kosovo political analyst, describes this as “proxy politics”: a relationship shaped by, and contingent on, Pristina’s ties with the US rather than an autonomous bilateral policy.

From security consumer to provider

Pristina presents the Gaza role as an opportunity to give back. In March, Prime Minister Albin Kurti said Kosovo was ready to help Gaza because it had benefitted from international forces since 1999.

Emini said Kosovo has long desired to contribute to peace and security, but its lack of UN membership narrows its options.

“Joining a US-led international initiative offers Kosovo something it has been seeking for years: international visibility and an opportunity to demonstrate that it can contribute to international security,” she said. “There is also a degree of reciprocity here.”

She cautioned against a simple comparison with Gaza, where the political and security environment is fundamentally different.

Muhaxhiri expects a symbolic payoff.

“A significant military role is not a realistic expectation,” he said. Still, participation in high-profile initiatives can help consolidate Kosovo’s state identity, build relationships and advance its wider international integration, he added.

An unresolved contradiction

Kosovo’s national story rests on international protection for civilians exposed to state violence and on self-determination.

Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza, launched after the Hamas-led attacks of October 7, 2023, has killed tens of thousands of Palestinians. Israel faces a genocide case at the International Court of Justice; the International Criminal Court has issued arrest warrants for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defence Minister Yoav Gallant over alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity.

For Emini, Pristina has not resolved the tension between its language on Serbia and its position on Gaza.

“The question in Pristina has been less about whether the two positions can be reconciled in purely legal terms, and more about where the United States stands, what Kosovo’s strategic interests are – and what alliances Kosovo can build,” she said.